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Spillovers from globalization on land use: 












The effect of globalization on the environment and natural resource use in developing 
countries is hotly debated. We contribute to this debate through the analysis of primary 
data collected with small contract farmers in Madagascar that produce vegetables for 
export to Europe. Strong spillover effects of these trade opportunities on land use exist.  
Using a matched plot sampling design, the productivity of rice - the main domestically 
consumed staple - is shown to be two thirds higher on those fields that were contracted 
during the off-season for the production of vegetables. This increase in yields is linked to 
an increase of soil fertility due to the application of fertilizer and compost which farmers 
would not use prior to the contracts. While agricultural output goes up significantly, 
labor productivity stays the same, suggesting that there is greater labor absorption on 
existing land and the diffusion of this type of technology/contract farming at a larger 
scale throughout Madagascar would be expected to substantially decrease incentives to 
deforest by increasing wages and boosting productivity of existing lands relative to newly 
deforested ones.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Globalization, trade liberalization and the lowering of barriers to trade has generally led 
to an increased inflow of foreign investments and the establishment of multinationals in 
developing countries. Critics argue that this type of investments cause more harm than 
good as they exploit the workers in developing countries and might lead to permanent 
environmental damage. Environmental degradation in particular could potentially be 
linked to mainly two factors due to globalization. First, the increase in trade might lead to 
higher incomes which would alter demand for environmental goods and services 
(Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Cropper and Griffith, 1994). Second, globalization might 
also lead to increasing investments in countries with lower environmental standards and 
the global natural resource base might end up irreversibly depleted or damaged (Reed, 
2001).  
 
While these arguments are potentially valid, they ultimately have to be tested and verified 
by empirical evidence. We contribute to this research by looking at a case study of the 
impact on land use of the contract farming for export of vegetables from developing 
countries. We study the effect of such contractual arrangements on land use in the case of 
Madagascar. We show that, using a matched pair sampling method where we control for 
the effect of plot and farmer characteristics, rice yields on the plots that are contracted in 
the off-season are two thirds higher than on regular rice plots. There are thus potentially 
high beneficial environmental spillovers from contract farming for exports: the existing 
agricultural land is more intensively used as land is cultivated in the off-season and 
production is higher in the main season.  
 
This is an important finding given that land extensification and deforestation has been the 
norm in Madagascar as to feed a rapidly growing population. It is estimated that, over the 
last forty years, about 20% of the increase of agricultural production was achieved 
through intensification of the existing land and 80% through land extensification often at 
the expense of forested land (World Bank, 2003; Moser, 2004; Green and Sussman, 
1990; Jarosz, 1993; Keck et al., 1994). This is even more dramatic given the unique   3
biodiversity that is found in the forests in Madagascar (Goodman and Benstead, 2003; 
Kull, 2000; McConnell, 2002). The government and the donors alike have therefore been 
trying to devise schemes, but mostly unsuccessful or unsustainable, as to increase 
productivity on the existing land in cultivation. Our results seem to indicate that 
increasing trade might lead in some cases to the much sought-after land intensification.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we develop a conceptual framework. 
Second, we explain the methodology and present the set-up of the survey that was used 
for primary data collection. In the third chapter, we give some background information 
on the farmers visited and the contractual arrangements in place for the production of 
vegetables. In section four, we look specifically at the issues related to rice productivity 
based on the declarations of the farmers themselves. Then, the econometric results are 




A primary survey with 200 randomly selected contract farmers was organized during the 
months of June and July 2004, i.e. immediately after the rice harvest of the main season, 
as the main focus of the study was to measure the spillovers of contract farming on rice. 
We opted to select those households with ricefields as to make the measurement of 
spillover effects straightforward. Anecdotic evidence suggests that these spillover effects 
are equally well present on the uplands. However, they are more difficult to measure and 
quantify given the multitude of crops that are usually grown on upland plots. 
 
A comprehensive survey was then implemented where questions were asked on the 
demographic situation of the household, land assets, the nature of the contract, the 
relationships with the firm, the benefits and disadvantages of working with contracts and 
perceived effects on welfare. As Malagasy farmers commonly cultivate many small plots 
and in order to keep data collection simple, we asked the enumerators and the farmers to 
                                                 
2 However, this does not need to be the case. Minten and Méral (2005) show that an increase in trade has 
also led to increased deforestation, especially in the South-West of the country.   4
select one lowland plot with a contract with the firm and a second lowland plot without 
off-season crops and contracts. It was asked that, if possible, plots would be selected with 
similar topographic characteristics.  
 
Detailed questions were then asked on the production levels and the production 
conditions of these selected plots during the rice production and the off-season cultivation 
periods. Because these two plots were cultivated simultaneously, we are able to correct 
for farmer-and plot specific effects that typically bias cross-sectional productivity 
analysis (Barrett et al., 2004).  
 
For our econometric estimations we rely on the panel data literature that we adjust to 
study the problem at hand. For this, we build on the methodology that was recently 
developed by Barrett et al. (2004). As two plots are selected that are cultivated by the 
same farmer, fixed variables related to the community and household - which are often 
very difficult to measure – can be ignored and the analysis can be focused on the effect of 
plot specific factors. Given that we have a significant number of variables that control for 
potential physical differences, we are able to separate out the effect of spillovers from 
differences in physical characteristics.    
 
The technologies on the two rice plots, the contracted and the regular plot, can be 
represented by general functional forms:  
yc = f(x,z)                      (1) 
yn = g(x,z)                      (2) 
where the f and g subscripts reflect the technology employed. Using a Cobb-Douglas 
specification, this gives us:  
lnyc=αc0+Σi=1
rβcilnxci+Σi=1
sγcizci     (3) 
lnyn=αn0+Σi=1
rβnilnxni+Σi=1
sγnizni       (4) 
where  lny is the logarithm of rice output, lnx is the input application rates, and z is 
exogenous effects on the production of the plot.  
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When we stack the observations from the two different technologies and add an indicator 
variable, Contract, taking value one on rice plots with a contract in the off-season and 
zero on those rice plots cultivated without a contract, the specification can be written as:  
lny=αn0+Σi=1
rβnilnxi+ Σi=1
sγnizni +Contract[α0 + Σi=1
rβilnxi +Σi=1
sγizi]       (5)  
where α0 captures captures the expected base productivity difference irrespective of input 
levels (αc0-αn0). We can directly estimate equation (5) using a random effects estimator.  
However, unobserved heterogeneity might bias the estimated coefficients of the two 
production functions and will therefore also bias estimates of the base and marginal 
productivity differentials of interest if we estimate equation (5) directly.  
 
If individual farmers are simultaneously using both technologies, we can use the matched 
pairs sample – a sample of paired plots cultivated by the same farmer in the same year, 
one with the new contract, the other without contract in the off-season – to resolve the 
unobserved heterogeneity problem.  If we subtract equation (4) from equation (3), we get 
the differential production function 
dy = α0 +Σi=1
rβidlnxi+ Σi=1
sαidzi + dε      (6) 
Where dlny= lnyc-lnyn is the difference in rice output, dlnx=lnxc-lnxn  reflects the 
difference in input application rates on the two plots, dz=zc-zn reflects exogenous 
differences in the plots, dε = εc-εn is a mean zero, independent error term. All farmer-
specific but plot-invariant characteristics, whether observed or unobserved, have been 
differenced away to remove potential sources of bias. Direct estimation of equation (6) 
therefore gives consistent and unbiased estimates of productivity differences attributable 
to the contract technology (Barrett et al., 2004). 
 
3. Descriptive statistics of the farmers 
 
The households interviewed have on average six members. Half of the members are less 
than 15 years old. 7% of the households are female-headed. The average age of the 
household head is 37 years. Only 1% of them did not do any studies at all. 64% of them 
had finished primary schools. 27% of the contractors are member of a farmers’   6
organization. The selected household has on average 8 years of experience with contract 
farming.  
 
Farm sizes of contractors are small. The average area cultivates is a little below 1 hectare, 
the national average (Minten et al., 2003). About one-third of the total area is the more 
valuable lowland used for rice cultivation. Households own 3 rice plots on average. 
During the agricultural season 2003-2004, farmers had on average 5 ares under contract 
in total over the whole year. The contracted crop was in most cases French beans. 97% of 
the farmers declared to have grown this crop over the last agricultural season. To a lesser 
extent, the contract involved gherkins (87%). Leek, peas and other crops were relatively 
less important.  
 
The institutional arrangements between the firm and the farmers are set-up as micro-
contracts. The written contracts are standardized with identical inputs, credit conditions 
and prices by product. Once a contract is signed, the farmers are then required to follow 
the rigid instructions of the firm. They have to labor the land in time and have to apply 
two card-loads of compost on the plot before the planting. Seeds, fertilizer and pesticides 
are distributed by the firm and have to be paid back in kind. The value of the average 
credit per contract is estimated at about 10,000 Ariary or 5 US dollar. This compares to 
an average value of produce sold under one contract of 15 US dollar.  
 
One of the contributions of the firm is that it teaches farmers how to make compost. The 
compost consists of a mixture of manure and vegetable matter. Its main benefit on the 
fields is in maintaining the soil structure, to provide nitrogen and other minerals that 
promote healthy crop growth and in providing the ability of the soil to retain moisture 
(Jacoby et al., 2004). The use of compost is long-lasting and can have an effect on the 
fertility of the soil for some years and might therefore be the cause of spillover effects. 
The compost that the farmer makes is then combined with chemical fertilizer. 
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4. Rice productivity in Madagascar and qualitative evidence  
 
Madagascar is a rice economy par excellence and rice is by far the major staple grown in 
the country. To start off the analysis on rice productivity of the contracting households, 
we rely on the perceptions of the households themselves regarding determinants of rice 
productivity. A question was asked on what households considered the main constraint to 
increased rice productivity on their lowland plots. They were asked to rank twelve types 
of potential constraints on a scale from 1 (not important) to 4 (very important).  
 
The answers show the extent to which households see access to nutrients as a main 
constraint to improved rice productivity in the highlands of Madagascar (Table 1). 71% 
of the farmers gave this answer when the ‘very important’ and ‘important’ categories are 
combined. Access to labor is the second most important constraint and on third comes 
access to cattle for manure, again indicating the problem of nutrient replenishment. These 
results are consistent with previous studies in the highlands of Madagascar. For example, 
Freudenberger (1998) found in villages in the province in Fianarantsoa that farmers 
considered access to cattle for manure to be more important than access to land to 
increase their rice production. Randrianarisoa and Minten (2005) came to similar 
conclusions in the Vakinankaratra and Fianarantsoa region.  
 
These results indicate to what extent contract farming might ease production constraints 
in rice productivity given that access to inputs is mentioned by the majority of the 
farmers as the main constraint to higher rice productivity. We now turn to the quantitative 
analysis of the spillover effects. 
 
5. Spillovers on land use 
  
Unconditional land productivity differences between the two types of plots are calculated. 
The results indicate that rice productivity is 64% higher on the plots with a contract 
compared to those plots without a contract and off-season crops: yields increase from 3,6 
to 6,0 ton per hectare. A t-test shows that these differences are largely significant. The   8
results are similar when production levels are corrected for those farmers that say that 
production was less due to cyclone Gafilo. A selection equation and the simple 
descriptive statistics might indicate that the simple unconditional land productivity 
averages might still mask some different treatments that can not be separated in simple 
averages. We will therefore separate these different effects using multivariate regression 
analysis.  
 
As explained in the methodological section, a differential yield regression was first run to 
explain land productivity differences between the two plots (Table 2). In this 
specification, all farmer- and community-specific variables, observed or unobserved, 
have been differenced away to remove all type of potential bias. The marginal yield 
effect estimates are thus consistent in this estimate. In a second specification, the random 
effect model, farmers’ characteristics were allowed to vary and to explain variation in the 
pooled yield differences. A Hausman test was run to test for the appropriateness of the 
two models. The results indicate that the random effect model is strongly rejected and 
that the differential yield specification is preferred. 
 
The results of the differential yield regression indicate that the physical characteristics 
contribute little to the explanation of yield differences between the two plots as none of 
their coefficients turn out significant. More labor use leads to significantly higher 
productivity while input use in rice production has surprisingly little effect. It might be 
that inputs are relatively more used on those plots that suffer fertility constraints. The 
number of years of experience on the plot leads to significantly higher productivity. One 
year of extra experience increases productivity by almost 2%. The natural shocks have 
the expected negative effect. One extra day of flooding during the cultivation period 
reduces the yield by 6%. This illustrates to what extent the cyclone Gafilo might have 
affected rice production of the year 2004. 
 
Turning to our variables of interest, the intercept is shown to be large and significant, 
indicating that there are significant rice productivity differences between contracted and 
non-contracted plots. The difference is estimated to be 2298 kilogram per hectare, close   9
to the unconditional yield difference. So, the contract during the off-season improves land 
productivity in the main season. The effect of variation of other off-season activities was 
also tested. The number of years that the contract has been in place on the particular plot 
matters. Every extra year would increase productivity by 3%. Other off-season crops lead 
also to higher productivity but less so than for the years of contracts. This effect is also 
statistically not significant. Additional contracts that were fulfilled on top of the one that 
is accounted for in the base increase, lead to an increase of 12% of the production of rice 
yields for every extra contract. T-values are highly significant. Other off-season crops do 
not have that same effect as its coefficient is not significant. Our results indicate thus that 
the strict input and fertilization requirements by the firm lead to strong spillovers on rice 
production.  
 
We test for the robustness of these spillover results by using the ‘corrected’ yield, i.e. the 
yield that farmers would have expected if there would not have been a cyclone. The 
results are mostly consistent with the previous analysis. The base productivity gain 
increases a little bit, to 3137 kg/ha. Most of the other results show significance of the 
same variables and the coefficients are of similar magnitudes.   
 
Finally, we did an Oaxaca-Binder decomposition to explain the driving forces for the 
differences in yields between the two plots. We differentiate between unconditional 
productivity gains, marginal yield gains due to changes in input and labor use and 
differences explained by plot-specific characteristics. The results indicate that most of the 
difference is explained by a base productivity effect. 92% and 95% of the difference in 
yield between the contracted and the non-contracted plots for the observed and the 
corrected yield respectively is explained by a change in intercept. Little is explained by a 
change in inputs, additional off-season activities and plot-specific characteristics. 
   
6. Conclusions 
 
The effect of globalization on the environment and natural resource use in developing 
countries is hotly debated. We contribute to this debate through the analysis of primary   10
data collected from small contract farmers in Madagascar that produce vegetables for 
export to Europe. Strong spillover effects of these trade opportunities on land use exist. 
Using a matched plot design, the productivity of rice, the main domestically consumed 
staple, is shown to increase by 67% on those fields that were contracted during the off-
season for the production of vegetables. This increase in yields seems especially linked to 
an increase of soil fertility due to the application of compost which most farmers would 
not use prior to the contracts. These results are corroborated by qualitative statements of 
farmers who indicated that maintaining soil fertility was a major constraint to improved 
rice productivity. The nutrient constraint might thus be alleviated by the trade 
opportunities. 
 
As contract farming, due to increased globalization and the larger emphasis on quality 
and safety issues, will become more important in the future, and this especially so in 
developing countries, this theme should be fertile ground for further research as to better 
help guide policy. Further research could look at why this type of investment for the 
production of agricultural produce for exports is still rare in Madagascar, or Africa for 
that matter, the comparison of the reasons for the success of this type of contract 
compared to those that failed, to what extent the technology transfer of the production of 
compost is sustainable, the effect of the contracts on welfare, and the spillover effects of 
this technology on non-contract farmers in the same or neighboring villages.    
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World Bank (2003), Review of agricultural and environmental sector Table 1: Ranking of the importance of specific constraints on rice productivity 
Constraint Not A bit  Rather Very Total
Insecure property rights 78 12 8 2 100
Access to cattle for labor 27 36 15 22 100
Access to cattle for manure 17 21 27 35 100
Access to labor 5 25 34 36 100
Access to agricultural equipment 11 32 18 39 100
Access to agricultural inputs (fertilizer) 7 22 27 44 100
Access to better irrigation 23 32 12 33 100
Access to extension 10 31 27 31 100
Access to credit 10 35 26 29 100
Opportunities to sell 27 41 21 11 100
Storage 67 29 3 1 100
Avoid silt 71 16 3 10 100
Avoid losses due to plant diseases 62 19 9 10 100
Avoid floods 71 13 5 11 100
Avoid droughts 71 13 5 11 100
Source: Farmer survey, 2004
Ranking Importance 
   1
Table 2: Production functions for rice yields on contracted and non-contracted plot
Variable Unit Coefficient t-value Coefficient z-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient z-value
intercept 7.741 32.260 7.244 18.460 8.051 42.410 7.157 21.090
Input use during rice cultivation
labor use per ha during the main season log(number) 0.128 4.890 0.146 7.390 0.105 5.080 0.118 7.230
input use per ha during the main season log(Ariary+1) -0.018 -1.190 -0.010 -1.200 -0.002 -0.140 -0.002 -0.330
Shocks and experience
experience with the plot years 0.016 2.370 0.005 1.440 0.008 1.560 0.003 0.980
problems with drought days -0.006 -1.760 -0.008 -3.070 -0.002 -0.680 -0.002 -0.910
problems with flooding  days -0.059 -2.680 -0.056 -3.290 -0.023 -1.330 -0.018 -1.310
Off-season activities
contract farming on this plot years 0.031 1.720 0.004 0.290 0.035 2.430 0.010 0.860
off-season cropping on this plot years 0.007 0.690 0.015 1.840 0.013 1.670 0.016 2.450
no of contracts this ag. season number 0.120 3.030 0.094 3.210 0.079 2.530 0.083 3.380
non-contracted off-season crops this ag. season number -0.013 -0.170 0.095 1.820 0.037 0.610 0.080 1.840
Physical characteristics plot
irrigation with a dam  yes=1 -0.029 -0.290 0.095 1.810 -0.070 -0.900 0.089 2.000
black soil yes=1 -0.037 -0.990 -0.018 -0.670 -0.038 -1.300 -0.017 -0.750
argilic texture yes=1 0.060 1.030 0.008 0.220 0.062 1.330 0.019 0.620
Household effects
age years 0.003 0.150 0.018 1.110
age squared years*2 0.000 -0.060   0.000 -1.130
gender head of household  male=1 0.102 1.650 0.090 1.680
level of education years 0.024 1.960 0.016 1.520
size of household number 0.003 0.210   -0.002 -0.190
sigma_u 0.400 0.164 0.372 0.171
sigma_e 0.416 0.416 0.329 0.329




*: village dummies included but not reported
#: In 2004, the cyclone Gafilo hit in the Highlands of Madagascar; for those farmers that were 
affected, it was asked how their yield would have been, given the same inputs, without this cyclone
Dep. var. = log (yield) in kg/ha Dep. var. = corrected log (yield) in kg/ha#
Differential yield Random effect* Differential yield Random effect*  2
 